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Abstract 
There’s a lack of research on the relationship between families’ 
attitudes toward insurance and their financial behavior. The Italian 
insurance market appears weak with regard to non life and non motor 
insurance: Italy ranks only 18th in Europe in terms of the ratio 
between non life and non motor premiums and GDP. The propensity 
to subscribe to an insurance contract appears largely to depend on 
geographical area, qualification and job activity. Regardless of their 
wealth, families subscribing to a non life and non motor insurance 
policy show a significantly lower propensity for financial liquidity. 
This relationship suggests an opportunity: selling insurance products 
to high liquidity families offers financial industry the possibility to 
sell them new financial assets too. There is a final benefit for Italian 
families, whose high liquidity indicates risk adversity while their 
propensity not to buy insurance exposes them to great real risks: 
buying more insurance products they will be less exposed to real risks 
and have a better return on their financial investments. 
 
1 Introduction 
The process of financialization that has affected the main developed economies 
in recent decades has led, among other effects
3
, the increase of intertwining 
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between operators once considered separated, such as banks and insurance 
companies. In a report commissioned by the OECD you can read “It is our firm 
belief that the combination of banking and insurance products, as is now done 
through bancassurance and assurfinance, is just the first step of a more profound 
development. The complementarity in time and space between different financial 
and insurance products not only creates natural incentives for cross-selling and 
packaging but also for innovative product integration.”4 
The development of the “bancassurance” phenomenon, namely the sale of life 
insurance policies by the postal and bank branches, which in 2010 accounted for 
70% of the production of new individual life policies in Italy
5
, represents a 
successful strategy that was able to seize the business side of these trends. 
However, less explored are the behaviors of consumers-savers in between the 
insurance and financial sectors. This analysis begins from a not very common 
concept in our country: the optimization of the allocation of household savings 
embedded in insurance damage coverage. The current view tends to consider 
damage insurance as an expense. Actually, such policies offer the household a 
guarantee to protect their wealth, which is nothing but savings accumulated over 
time. In the absence of insurance coverage, recovering from financial losses, 
including family members’ health and physical integrity among the family assets, 
requires the mobilization of shares from both the current income and from 
savings specifically designed to cover such risks. With an appropriate insurance 
coverage, the family will not only have more security in the use of their future 
income, but also savings could be allocated in ways that are less related to 
contingency and thus more oriented to seize medium-long term objectives. As a 
potential result, insured households should have a lower propensity to hold liquid 
assets for precautionary purposes.  
The purpose of this analysis is to find an empirical confirmation of this 
hypothesis
6
. In specific, we intend to test the hypothesis that, as a consequence of 
a higher insurance cover in the non motor insurance area, it would be possible to 
allocate one’s assets more efficiently, reducing the amount of liquid assets held 
for reasons other than strictly financial ones. This is because insured families, 
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through insurance mutuality, have an umbrella that protects them against a wide 
range of adverse events
7
, making less compelling the need to hold immediately 
available forms of savings (liquidity).  
 
2 International comparisons  
In 2009, the Italian insurance market held the 4th position, in size, in Europe, 
behind Germany, the United Kingdom and France. However, the ranking among 
European countries according to the ratio between non life premium and gross 
domestic product (GDP) sees Italy in a lower position
8
: at the 14th position 
(Image 1).  
Image 1  
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By dividing the non life market into two broad categories (coverage related to 
motor traffic and other classes), the picture of Italy regarding insurance is further 
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delineated. Our country is third in Europe with reference to motor premium 
income on GDP (Image 2), due the great amount of cars owned by the Italians, 
and a higher average premium compared to other European countries
9
. 
Image 2  
0,0%
0,2%
0,4%
0,6%
0,8%
1,0%
1,2%
1,4%
1,6%
1,8%
Slo
ve
n
ia
B
u
lgaria
Italy
Ice
lan
d
C
ro
atia
C
ze
ch
 R
e
p
u
b
lic
Sp
ain
Esto
n
ia
R
o
m
an
ia
C
yp
ru
s
P
o
rtu
gal
A
u
stria
Lu
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
Sw
itze
rlan
d
B
e
lgiu
m
M
e
d
ia C
e
a
Fran
ce
M
alta
Slo
vakia
U
n
ite
d
 K
in
gd
o
m
P
o
lan
d
Latvia
H
u
n
gary
G
e
rm
an
y
Ire
lan
d
N
e
th
e
rlan
d
s
G
re
e
ce
Fin
lan
d
D
e
n
m
ark
N
o
rw
ay
Sw
e
d
e
n
Lith
u
an
ia
Tu
rke
y
Motor premiums to Gdp ratio
 
 
On the contrary, in the European ranking for non motor premium income on GDP 
(Image 3) Italy ranks 18th.  
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Therefore, our country’s economy (both regarding businesses and families) 
operates within a system of structural under-insurance compared to the main 
continental counterparts (Germany, France and Spain). On the other hand, it 
seems that in Italy the dynamics of non motor insurance did not develop in a way 
that enables its convergence on the GDP towards the average values found in 
other economic systems (Image 4).  
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Image 4  
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In particular, although similar data are not available from other countries, the 
component of non motor insurance that refers to the private segment shows an 
impact on GDP equal to 0.42% versus 0.67% of the companies segment
10
. It is 
reasonable to assume that companies, even within a framework of overall lack of 
confidence in the insurance world, are nevertheless inclined to become insured as 
a result of risk assessments related to the activities they perform. This does not 
happen, most likely, in the case of families.  
 
3 Non motor insurance  
The insurance policies for such branches, take into account different types of risk. 
Image 5 shows the premium income composition in Italy for 2010
11
.  
Image 5  
                                                          
10
 Prometeia estimates, July 2010. 
11
 Isvap (2010). 
Mod.01P.5.5 
Rev.01 24.5.08 
33%
34%
19%
5%
4%
5%
Non life premiums: breakdown per branches
Accident & health
Property
General liability
Credit
Mat
Others
 
 
As mentioned earlier, Italian families often consider such forms of insurance as 
pure costs, deriving such attitude from the motor vehicle civil liability insurance 
(Responsabilitá Civile Auto - RCA) that, because of its mandatory nature, is 
commonly (and erroneously) regarded as a tax. This discourages Italians from 
subscribing to insurance damage policies. Hence, low level of individual 
insurance, which is affecting the Italian low ratio between non motor insurance 
expenditure and GDP.  
4 The sample  
This research is based on data obtained from the biennial survey conducted by 
the Banca d’Italia “Italian households’ budgets”. The reference year is 2008, the 
latest available when compiling this essay.  
It is a representative sample of the universe of Italian families, consisting of 
7,977 households, on which were collected various information of social, 
demographic, economic and patrimonial nature.  
In processing data, it was taken into account, as suggested by the institute that 
conducted the survey, the sampling weight (PESOFIT), supplied by the archives 
made available to the public. However, there is a significant default bias in the 
information resulting from this type of questionnaire, caused mainly by a 
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widespread reticent behavior
12
. Table 1 shows the comparison between the 
relative weights for the main net wealth components per household
13
:  
Table 1 
 
La ricchezza delle 
famiglie italiane
14
 
Italian households’ 
budgets 
Real Assets 69.0% 94.9% 
Financial Assets 40.7% 9.8% 
Financial Liabilities -9.7% -4.7% 
Net Wealth 100.0% 100.0% 
 
It can be noticed, in the data from the questionnaire, a significant shift in size 
from financial to real assets. Proof of such distortion is obtained by comparing 
the average values for such sizes per family obtained from the two sources cited: 
Table 2 
 euro 
A = La ricchezza 
delle famiglie 
italiane 
B = Italian 
households’ 
budgets 
% B / A 
Real Assets’ Average 239,951 233,099 97.1% 
Financial Assets’ Average 141,671 24,067 17.0% 
Financial Liabilities’ 
Average 
33,813 11,473 33.9% 
Net Wealth’s Average 347,809 245,693 70.6% 
 
While real assets appear to be fully represented in the questionnaire statements, 
the same does not happen in relation to wealth invested in financial assets (and, 
to a lesser extent, also for financial liabilities). Of course, at the end of 2008, the 
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dicembre 2009. 
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extremely negative performance of the worldwide financial markets could justify 
an underestimation of the real value of the wealth invested in financial assets. 
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that it could escape 83% of one’s financial 
wealth. 
Therefore, in order to minimize misinterpretations caused by the processing of 
microeconomic data obtained from the sample, we have opted for a limitation in 
the use of absolute data in favour of arguments based on relative measurements 
(ratios, percentages, etc.) or on comparisons. 
 
5 Non motor insured and uninsured  
We have considered the types of non motor insurance identified by a positive 
reply to the questions in section F (insurance forms) in the questionnaire:  
 F06 – presence of policies related to accident and sickness 
insurance;  
 F19 – presence of insurance policies related to theft, fire, 
hail, civil liability (with the exception of the compulsory 
motor vehicle civil liability insurance - RCA).  
Although the amount of annual expenditure for such insurance coverage 
(questions F09 and F21 in the same section) is also available, it was deemed that 
such information is affected by the income as well as by the family wealth. For 
the aim of this research, it is more important to identify the household attitude 
toward insurance, best represented by the presence (and number) of subscribed 
policies.  
The amount of households in the sample that have bought at least one insurance 
policy other than motor vehicle civil liability (23.9%) confirms the low 
prevalence of these kinds of insurance. 
Before we continue with the details of the analysis, it is useful to give a general 
outline of the modalities in which the characteristic “presence of non motor 
insurance” is deployed in terms of specific socio-demographic criteria15. Further 
investigations, obtainable by crossing the various socio-demographic 
characteristics, do not represent the objective of this work.  
A look at the geographical distribution of the propensity to subscribe to an 
insurance policy shows a considerable differentiation between the various areas 
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2010. 
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of the country (Image 6). In the North East, more than 40% of the households 
subscribed to at least one insurance policy other than the RCA. High values are 
also found in the North West. The Centre is just below national average. The 
percentage of policy holders in the South
16
 and the Islands is surprisingly low: 
only a small minority of respondents (only 4%) report having an insurance policy 
not tied to private means of transport.  
Image 6  
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With reference to educational qualifications
17
, the percentage of households 
covered by non motor insurance policies follows an increasing progression 
according to education. People with no formal qualifications show a propensity to 
get insured equal to almost zero (Image 7). At the other extreme, there are those 
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households whose head has obtained a university degree (diploma, bachelor, 
graduate, postgraduate degree), which show a great tendency (more than 45%) to 
get insurance coverage. In the middle there are those families whose 
“breadwinner” has an intermediate qualification.  
Image 7  
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The distribution between insured and uninsured households according to the 
breadwinner’s professional qualification shows a rather high propensity to get 
insured among executives, managers, entrepreneurs and professionals (Image 8). 
In the last two categories mentioned, it comes into play, in all probability, the 
need to provide coverage in connection with professional activity, a factor that 
causes some misinterpretation that might overestimate their attitudes towards 
insurance.  
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Image 8  
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Finally, a further perspective is related to the head of the household’s age. Using 
the age groups in the questionnaire, we obtain the distribution shown in Image 9. 
It does not emerge a specific characterization of the propensity to get insured 
according to the head of the household’s age. We observe a maximum in the age 
group between fifty and sixty-five, probably the result of a stage in life in which 
the commitment to productive activities and responsibility towards one’s family 
is higher. However, in this breakdown are not to be found neither particularly 
high nor particularly low values, a symptom of the low discriminating power of 
such characteristic.  
 
 
 
Image 9  
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6 A logistic model  
In order to verify the findings illustrated in the previous section, we created a 
logistic regression model. The dichotomous dependent variable is the ownership 
(or not) of at least one non motor insurance policy. The starting set of 
explanatory variables consists of:  
 AR - real wealth (quantitative variable);  
 AF - financial wealth (quantitative variable);  
 AF1 - amount of deposits (quantitative variable);  
 PF - financial liabilities (quantitative variable);  
 AREA5 - area of residence (five geographical divisions, 
qualitative variable);  
 STUDIO - Head of the household’s educational 
qualifications (ordinal variable);  
 QUAL - Head of the household’s work status (qualitative 
variable);  
 CLETA - Head of the household’s age (ordinal variable).  
The procedure with backward elimination resulted in the exclusion of three 
variables: financial wealth, amount of deposits and head of the household’s age.  
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After having simplified the model in such way, the test of joint significance of 
coefficients allowed to reject the null hypothesis H 0: β 1 = β 2 = ... = β 5 = 0.  
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0                                                                       
                                                                                                                                         
                    Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq                                                              
                                                                                                                                         
                    Likelihood Ratio      1847.3097       13         <.0001                                                              
                    Score                 1637.5832       13         <.0001                                                              
                    Wald                  1149.6607       13         <.0001 
  
This analysis was also confirmed by the high number of matches found (82.5%):  
 
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses                                                          
                                                                                                                                         
                      Percent Concordant        82.5    Somers' D    0.652                                                               
                      Percent Discordant        17.3    Gamma        0.654                                                               
                      Percent Tied               0.3    Tau-a        0.224                                                               
                      Pairs                 10915142    c            0.826 
 
 
The estimate of the regression parameters is represented below: 
  
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates                                                                      
                                                                                                                                         
                                              Standard          Wald                                                                     
             Parameter      DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq                                                       
                                                                                                                                         
             Intercept       1     -2.9912      0.1118      715.8726        <.0001                                                       
             AR              1    1.279E-6    1.116E-7      131.4160        <.0001                                                       
             PF              1    4.025E-6    8.955E-7       20.2025        <.0001                                                       
             STUDIO          1      0.2270      0.0219      107.0657        <.0001                                                       
             AREA5     1     1      0.6821      0.0652      109.3623        <.0001                                                       
             AREA5     2     1      1.6449      0.0639      663.5712        <.0001                                                       
             AREA5     3     1      0.3836      0.0702       29.8509        <.0001                                                       
             AREA5     4     1     -1.3091      0.1086      145.4287        <.0001                                                       
             QUAL      1     1     -0.4533      0.0832       29.7119        <.0001                                                       
             QUAL      2     1      0.0897      0.0777        1.3325        0.2484                                                       
             QUAL      3     1      0.4783      0.1257       14.4682        0.0001                                                       
             QUAL      4     1      0.1878      0.1252        2.2492        0.1337                                                       
             QUAL      5     1     -0.0120      0.1138        0.0111        0.9161                                                       
             QUAL      6     1     0.00855      0.0628        0.0185        0.8917   
Regarding the first two quantitative independent variables (AR and PF, 
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respectively, the household’s real wealth and financial liabilities), there was a 
positive relationship, i.e. at the increasing of the value of the dependent variable, 
the odds ratio increases
18
. The third explanatory quantitative variable of ordinal 
nature (STUDIO, which is the educational qualification obtained by the head of 
the household), also shows a significant impact on the dependent variable: by 
increasing the period of schooling, the likelihood to get insured increases. 
Moving on to analyze the qualitative variables, we refer to the estimates of odds 
ratios produced with reference to one of the modalities assumed by the dependent 
variables.  
Odds Ratio Estimates                                                                                
                                                                                                                                         
                                           Point          95% Wald                                                                       
                       Effect           Estimate      Confidence Limits                                                                  
                                                                                                                                         
                       AR                  1.000       1.000       1.000                                                                 
                       PF                  1.000       1.000       1.000                                                                 
                       STUDIO              1.255       1.202       1.310         
 AREA5  1 vs 5       8.033       5.479      11.779                                                                 
                       AREA5  2 vs 5      21.038      14.371      30.799                                                                 
                       AREA5  3 vs 5       5.960       4.043       8.786                                                                 
                       AREA5  4 vs 5       1.097       0.706       1.704                                                                 
                       QUAL   1 vs 7       0.857       0.634       1.159                                                                 
                       QUAL   2 vs 7       1.475       1.093       1.991                                                                 
                       QUAL   3 vs 7       2.176       1.490       3.177                                                                 
                       QUAL   4 vs 7       1.627       1.115       2.375                                                                 
                       QUAL   5 vs 7       1.333       0.934       1.901                                                                 
                       QUAL   6 vs 7       1.360       1.037       1.784 
 
 
Regarding the geographical area, taking as a reference unit those families 
residing on the Islands, we have a very similar value in the Southern geographic 
area (1.097), while the households residing in the Centre, North West and North 
East show higher propensities to get insured. With regard to the head of 
                                                          
18
 The relationship between probabilities associated to a dichotomy is called 
odds. Given the event x, its odds is the result of the relationship π(x) / [1-π(x)], 
where π(x) is the probability of the event x and [1-π(x)] is the probability that x 
did not manifest. The odds ratio is the relationship between two odds values. For 
a quantitative independent variable, the odds ratio is equal to eβ and, in the case 
of a variation c of the independent variable, it is equal to ecβ, where β is the 
coefficient of such independent variable in the regression equation. 
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household’s work status, the reference unit is represented by “other unemployed”. 
It is evident a peak of positive variation for managers (2.176) and higher values 
for all other groups, with the exception of unskilled workers, whose odds ratio 
shows a decrease compared to the category of comparison.  
 
7 The weight of liquidity  
With reference to the two sample sub-categories (insured and uninsured), we 
calculated the average of the amount of the family assets and of the deposits 
component (AF1 variable
19
), identifying with the latter the liquidity kept 
available to deal with unexpected contingencies. Table 3 shows this data.  
Table 3  
 euro 
Insured Uninsured Total 
Deposits’ Average 18,287 11,832 13,378 
Financial Wealth’s Average 44,097 17,762 24,067 
Deposit / Financial Wealth 41.5% 66.6% 55.6% 
Real Wealth’s Average 414,325 176,051 233,099 
Financial Liabilities’ Average 22,469 8,012 11,473 
Net Wealth’s Average 435,953 185,802 245,693 
 
Those families that have subscribed to at least one non motor insurance showed 
an incidence of deposits on total financial wealth (41.5%) of 25.1 percentage 
points lower than the average for those households without insurance (66.6%)
20
. 
                                                          
19
 This cluster includes: Overnight Deposits, Deposits with agreed maturity up to 
2 years, Deposits redeemable at notice up to 3 months, Repos. 
20
 The correspondent data in the 2006 sample of the same survey show an 
incidence of deposits on financial wealth equal to 37,5% for insured households 
and to58,6% for uninsured ones, with a general average equal to 48,9%. In 
December 2008, reference date for the survey used in this paper, was a time 
characterized by a situation of heavy stress on financial markets. It is not 
surprising then to find an increasing in the incidence of deposits on financial 
wealth, both due to the effect of a clear preference for liquidity and the effect of a 
decrease in the value of financial wealth for other instruments, both phenomena 
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However, there is a factor to be taken into account: the significant difference 
between insured and uninsured families’ average household financial wealth, 
which is close to 2.5.  
The propensity to buy insurance could be a result of an increased availability of 
assets for wealthy families. A logical insight, given that a part of the non motor 
insurance covers family wealth: for example the policy that provides protection 
against theft or fire. However, such insurance policies refer to not so much 
financial wealth, but also real property (home, valuables, etc.). Real wealth too 
highlights a gap in favour of who is covered by at least a non motor insurance 
policy. The relationship between average real wealth of insured and uninsured 
households, however, is slightly lower (2.35), compared to what is found for 
financial wealth (2.48).  
The average amount of insured households’ financial liabilities is significantly 
higher than in families without insurance. It can be deduced that, as a whole, the 
families of non motor insurance subscribers have a more developed financial 
literacy, and therefore are able to seize also the indebting opportunities offered 
by the system in order to optimize their cash flow. This may be true, in particular, 
as regards the existence of a loan aimed at the purchase of the house.  
Data in Table 3 show the presence of an average net wealth 2.37 times higher for 
insured households compared to those without insurance.  
In conclusion, there is a significant difference in the impact of liquidity on 
financial wealth between the two subcategories of families. Prior to investigating 
its possible causes, it is necessary to verify whether this difference is large 
enough to indicate the presence of significantly different behaviours. We analyze 
the distribution
21
 of the variable amount of deposits on financial assets (Image 
10).  
Image 10  
                                                                                                                                   
caused by the fall of shares’ quotes on financial markets. However, it should be 
emphasized how the increase of the weight of deposits on financial wealth, 
recorded from 2006 to 2008, was averagely of 5,7%, with a +8% for uninsured 
households and only a +4% for insured households.  
21
 The intervals have been calculated in function of the average weight (55,6%) 
+/- the multiples of a tenth of the root mean square deviation (41,1%). From the 
calculation have been excluded families having a financial wealth equal to zero, 
i.e. 1238 families whose sampling weight (PESOFIT) is equal to 1224 units. 
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The modal value falls into the last class (weight of liquidity higher than 96.7% of 
financial wealth): there is a large number of families that, for various reasons, 
does not hold (or does not declare) financial instruments other than a simple 
deposit. The shape of the empirical distribution indicates that the variable in 
question is not distributed according to a Gaussian law. Therefore, we opted for 
using a nonparametric tool, the Smirnov test, which let us understand whether 
two samples belong to the same population. This test is based on the maximum 
difference that can be found between the homologous values of two empirical 
distribution functions. Table 4 shows data on the distribution functions22 of the 
variable “weight of deposits on financial wealth” for the two sets of families 
(insured and uninsured).  
Table 4  
Deposit / 
Insured Families Uninsured Families  
Financial 
Assets 
Number F(x) Number F(x) Dm,n 
<0.05 62 0.0356 76 0.0159 0.0197 
                                                          
22
 The number of families in the table is calculated by using the sampling weight 
allocated by the Banca d’Italia to each household. In the table are not included 
those families lacking wealth, for which the relationship between deposits and 
financial wealth does not have any meaning.  
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<0.10 73 0.0772 80 0.0326 0.0446 
<0.15 76 0.1205 92 0.0518 0.0687 
<0.20 86 0.1698 75 0.0673 0.1025 
<0.25 54 0.2010 69 0.0816 0.1194 
<0.30 59 0.2347 52 0.0925 0.1422 
<0.35 92 0.2876 62 0.1053 0.1823 
<0.40 42 0.3116 37 0.1129 0.1987 
<0.45 44 0.3367 50 0.1232 0.2135 
<0.50 42 0.3608 36 0.1307 0.2301 
<0.55 45 0.3867 52 0.1416 0.2452 
<0.60 31 0.4043 51 0.1521 0.2522 
<0.65 29 0.4210 44 0.1613 0.2598 
<0.70 22 0.4338 32 0.1680 0.2658 
<0.75 20 0.4455 43 0.1769 0.2686 
<0.80 37 0.4667 46 0.1864 0.2802 
<0.85 25 0.4812 46 0.1960 0.2853 
<0.90 24 0.4950 37 0.2036 0.2914 
<0.95 14 0.5033 44 0.2126 0.2906 
>=0.95 867 1.0000 3,786 1.0000 0.0000 
 
In the last column is reported the difference between the counterparts of the two 
distribution functions. The maximum value reached by this difference is equal to 
0.2914 (third item from the bottom). The threshold value for the one-sided test 
with alpha (error of first kind) equal to 1% is, according to the size of this 
sample, 0.0414. As 0.2914> 0.0414, the hypothesis of structural difference is 
confirmed, as regards the weight of liquidity, between the sets of insured and 
uninsured families. 
 
8 Analysis of classes of financial wealth  
Insured families show a significantly lower burden of liquidity on financial 
wealth than households without non motor insurance. The hypothesis that this 
gap is the result of the fact that insurances are able to free the family from the 
need to allocate a greater share of family wealth in liquid assets, clashes with the 
doubts generated by the systematic higher wealth detected among non motor 
insurance holders. A different interpretation could argue that the presence of 
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insurance policies is simply a reflection of a greater family wealth to be 
preserved.  
The analysis of variance, performed on the weights of liquidity in relation to a 
dual classification (presence of non motor insurance and class of financial 
wealth) with multiple measurements per class, generates the following result:  
 
Type 3 Tests of Fixed Effects                                                                           
                                                                                                                                         
                        Num     Den                   Valore                                                                             
          Effect         DF      DF    Chi-Square          F      Pr > ChiSq    Pr > F                                                   
                                                                                                                                         
          ASS             1    15.8         57.44      57.44          <.0001    <.0001                                                   
          CL_AF          16    6538       2859.01     178.69          <.0001    <.0001          
 
Indicating the significance of both factors taken into account in determining the 
value of the variable examined
23
. 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the burden of liquidity by comparing insured 
and uninsured families’ attitudes within equal intervals of wealth. We have 
therefore defined a segmentation of the households on the basis of their financial 
wealth; for this purpose intervals of five percentiles were calculated
24
. Within 
each interval liquidity and family wealth were added up and the families were 
counted, distinguishing between insured and uninsured ones. The results are 
reported in Table 5:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 The result of such test is to be considered with some reservations, given the 
distribution of the observed variable doesn’t fit with the Gaussian one (burden of 
liquidity on financial wealth). 
24
 Percentiles have been calculated, to simplify, on the basis of the non weighed 
distribution of the values of family wealth.  
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Table 5  
 
  Insured   Uninsured  
Perc. AF Num
ber 
Deposits Financial 
Assets 
Num
ber 
Deposits Financial 
Assets 
0.05 <0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.1 <0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.15 <0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2 <500 186 7,963 7,963 1,379 37,277 37,843 
0.25 <1441 89 80,107 80,721 360 334,785 340,163 
0.3 <2104 87 149,524 158,516 345 605,350 608,151 
0.35 <3167 62 169,855 175,836 399 1,122,737 1,144,074 
0.4 <4500 61 215,427 233,833 361 1,366,255 1,384,632 
0.45 <5117 87 415,203 427,038 327 1,602,710 1,608,461 
0.5 <6674 53 262,640 314,047 356 1,974,006 2,063,251 
0.55 <8000 58 389,398 416,584 285 2,013,218 2,061,730 
0.6 <10155 128 1,022,618 1,193,795 328 2,798,549 3,051,147 
0.65 <13790 96 912,818 1,123,230 290 2,993,408 3,439,997 
0.7 <17136 108 1,225,093 1,650,128 285 3,725,381 4,385,013 
0.75 <23000 97 1,270,519 1,918,871 285 4,335,208 5,705,861 
0.8 <30000 108 1,498,593 2,795,896 243 4,283,109 6,292,462 
0.85 <40000 155 2,776,575 5,312,651 216 4,882,997 7,297,826 
0.9 <57000 166 3,690,483 7,970,660 222 6,838,878 10,526,728 
0.95 <93141 174 5,120,313 12,633,514 185 7,821,527 13,139,271 
1 >=93141 195 15,717,768 47,804,919 201 25,052,274 44,678,914 
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 Total 1,910 34,924,898 84,218,202 6,067 71,787,669 107,765,525 
 
Obviously, the first three “vigintiles” are empty because a negative gross 
financial wealth cannot be hypothesized. Image 11 shows the distribution per 
vigintile of uninsured (white) and insured (gray) families. It is apparent the higher 
frequency of insured households among holders of higher financial assets.  
Image 11  
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We check the degree of homogeneity within the classes by comparing the average 
wealth of insured and uninsured households. Image 12 shows, for each vigintile, 
such deviations. Positive values indicate greater wealth by insured households, 
negative values reflect an opposite situation. With the exception of the extreme 
class, the differences are very limited and of variable sign.  
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Image 12  
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It could be argued that, by excluding the class of holders of financial assets above 
€ 93,141 from the calculation, the average difference between the weight of 
liquidity between insured and uninsured families would change. By calculating 
the means again and excluding the higher vigintile, we obtain the following 
values on the incidence of deposits on financial wealth: insured households 
52.7%, uninsured families74.1%. Between these two values there are 21.4 
percentage points, which is not an excessively lower value than the one obtained 
previously in the calculation including all observations (41.5% insured families, 
66.6% uninsured families). It can be concluded that the data in the extreme 
vigintile do not distort the comparison between the two groups.  
Table 6 shows the values of the incidence of deposits on financial wealth for 
each vigintile, broken down between insured and uninsured families. The last 
column (Diff) contains the differences, calculated as the weight of insured 
families’ deposits minus the weight of those of the uninsured ones. Thus, the 
positive values indicate a greater burden of liquidity for insured households and 
the negative values indicate the opposite situation. The clear prevalence of 
negative values (except the first two vigintile that are not empty) indicates that, 
given equal financial wealth, households with non motor insurance policies hold 
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lower levels of liquidity than their active financial assets. Of course, the intensity 
of the lower possession of liquid assets differs from vigintile to vigintile and is 
always less than the overall average (25.1%), on which impacts the different 
distribution of households among vigintiles. However, this result confirms that 
the presence of non motor insurance policies, given equal financial wealth, leads 
to reduce the amount of wealth tied up in liquid assets, a result that was found in 
earlier studies
25
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
 % Deposits  
AF Insured Uninsured Difference 
<0    
<0    
<0    
<500 100.0% 98.5% 1.5% 
<1441 99.2% 98.4% 0.8% 
                                                          
25
 (Focarelli, Savino and Zanghieri 2010: 11). 
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<2104 94.3% 99.5% -5.2% 
<3167 96.6% 98.1% -1.5% 
<4500 92.1% 98.7% -6.5% 
<5117 97.2% 99.6% -2.4% 
<6674 83.6% 95.7% -12.0% 
<8000 93.5% 97.6% -4.2% 
<10155 85.7% 91.7% -6.1% 
<13790 81.3% 87.0% -5.8% 
<17136 74.2% 85.0% -10.7% 
<23000 66.2% 76.0% -9.8% 
<30000 53.6% 68.1% -14.5% 
<40000 52.3% 66.9% -14.6% 
<57000 46.3% 65.0% -18.7% 
<93141 40.5% 59.5% -19.0% 
>=93141 32.9% 56.1% -23.2% 
Total 41.5% 66.6% -25.1% 
 
9 An analysis by total net total wealth  
Previously we have analyzed the behavior of households on the basis of their 
financial wealth. However, financial wealth is only part of the family wealth. The 
attitudes of families, with reference to the preference for liquidity, could be 
related to total wealth. Moreover, the liabilities payable by the households could 
play an important role in guiding the choice of asset allocation, thus affecting the 
definition of the optimal amount of liquidity to be held. Therefore, we perform 
again the above analysis, this time, by net wealth.  
The analysis of variance, performed on the amounts of liquidity in relation to a 
dual classification (presence of non auto insurance and class of net wealth owned 
by the family) with multiple measurements per class, generates the following 
result:  
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Type 3 Tests of Fixed Effects                                                                           
                                                                                                                                         
                        Num     Den                   Valore                                                                             
          Effect         DF      DF    Chi-Square          F      Pr > ChiSq    Pr > F                                                   
                                                                                                                                         
          ASS             1    60.5         64.41      64.41          <.0001    <.0001                                                   
          CL_W           19    6535        747.56      39.35          <.0001    <.0001  
  
Here too, both factors are significant in determining the value of the variable 
examined
26
. 
We calculate the weight of deposits on total financial wealth
27
, by analyzing the 
families grouped according to similar classes of net wealth. We apply the same 
steps mentioned earlier, this time with reference to net wealth, and we observe in 
Table 7, the percentile distribution of households according to whether they are 
insured or not:  
 
 
 
Table 7  
 
  Insured   Uninsured  
Percenti
les 
W Numbe
r 
Deposits Financial 
Wealth 
Number Deposits Financial 
Wealth 
0.05 <100 29 46,387 51,105 390 420,806 473,359 
0.1 <2000 48 44,562 49,065 409 194,732 198,613 
0.15 <5104 30 72,645 72,645 412 906,556 922,225 
0.2 <11594 46 233,306 239,066 374 2,024,483 2,083,264 
                                                          
26
 The result of such test is to be considered with some reservations, given the 
distribution of the observed variable doesn’t fit with the Gaussian one (burden of 
liquidity on financial wealth). 
27
 Calculating the amount of liquidity with reference to total or net wealth would 
not make sense. 
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0.25 <31000 56 458,128 708,113 342 2,975,808 3,556,789 
0.3 <64000 88 819,118 1,090,134 367 3,343,305 4,450,574 
0.35 <10000
0 
53 480,706 788,895 369 2,109,505 2,666,026 
0.4 <12100
0 
62 456,797 680,426 349 2,210,657 2,948,284 
0.45 <14844
6 
65 626,190 1,431,487 349 2,564,055 3,674,246 
0.5 <16346
8 
62 601,791 1,472,718 315 2,326,622 2,666,650 
0.55 <18958
8 
88 885,856 1,674,628 283 2,787,690 3,744,786 
0.6 <20886
6 
87 844,071 1,595,910 282 2,295,108 2,773,262 
0.65 <23628
8 
78 619,398 1,243,263 280 4,021,161 5,300,766 
0.7 <26619
9 
98 1,333,268 2,849,643 264 3,974,893 5,471,987 
0.75 <30542
0 
99 1,074,483 2,612,529 259 2,765,141 4,244,532 
0.8 <35341
9 
164 2,330,141 5,702,203 235 3,573,879 6,127,838 
0.85 <42512
1 
191 3,883,266 6,293,861 198 5,048,346 7,491,969 
0.9 <53100
0 
143 2,590,065 6,574,562 220 6,992,879 9,914,071 
0.95 <79820
0 
189 5,879,410 13,411,311 194 7,883,732 13,319,770 
1 >=7982
00 
235 11,645,307 35,676,638 177 13,368,311 25,736,513 
 Total 1,910 34,924,898 84,218,202 6,067 71,787,669 107,765,525 
 
By analyzing the distribution of the number of households within each vigintile 
(Image 13), it is confirmed the highest concentration of households with 
insurance coverage among the classes with higher net wealth.  
Image 13  
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We compare the average net wealth for insured and uninsured households within 
each vigintile. Image 14 shows such deviation for each class. Positive values 
indicate greater wealth by insured parties, negative values reflect an opposite 
situation. Again, with the exception of the extreme class, the differences are 
limited and variable in sign
28
.  
 
 
 
Image 14  
                                                          
28
 For the last but one class, characterized by a net wealth between 531,000 and 
798,000 Euros, the net wealth difference (nearly 25,000 Euros) could appear high 
in absolute value. However, in the context of the vigintile values, there is a 
difference lower than 4% of average wealth for insured families. 
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Excluding the last class, we obtain the following values of the incidence of 
deposits on financial wealth: 48% for insured families, 71.2%. for families 
without insurance. The difference between the two groups (23.2 percent) does not 
differ too much compared to what is obtained by performing calculations on all 
observations (respectively 41.5% and 66.6% for a difference of 25.1 points). 
Therefore, the data included in the extreme vigintile do not alter the overall 
result.  
Finally, we calculate the weight of liquidity by comparing insured and uninsured 
families for each vigintile. Data are reported in Table 8. The last column (Diff) 
shows the difference of the weight of liquidity on the financial wealth between 
insured and uninsured families: the former shows lower values in almost all 
groups. We can derive a substantial confirmation of what has been demonstrated 
earlier: insured households show a tendency to hold lower levels of liquidity than 
households without insurance.  
 
Table 8  
 
 % Deposits  
W Insured Uninsured Difference 
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<100 90.8% 88.9% 1.9% 
<2000 90.8% 98.0% -7.2% 
<5104 100.0% 98.3% 1.7% 
<11594 97.6% 97.2% 0.4% 
<31000 64.7% 83.7% -19.0% 
<64000 75.1% 75.1% 0.0% 
<100000 60.9% 79.1% -18.2% 
<121000 67.1% 75.0% -7.8% 
<148446 43.7% 69.8% -26.0% 
<163468 40.9% 87.2% -46.4% 
<189588 52.9% 74.4% -21.5% 
<208866 52.9% 82.8% -29.9% 
<236288 49.8% 75.9% -26.0% 
<266199 46.8% 72.6% -25.9% 
<305420 41.1% 65.1% -24.0% 
<353419 40.9% 58.3% -17.5% 
<425121 61.7% 67.4% -5.7% 
<531000 39.4% 70.5% -31.1% 
<798200 43.8% 59.2% -15.3% 
>=798200 32.6% 51.9% -19.3% 
Total 41.5% 66.6% -25.1% 
 
10 Conclusions 
Among the main factors affecting the probability of subscribing to a non motor 
insurance are not the geographical area of residence (variable that is related to the 
level of economic and social development of the various territorial divisions), 
educational qualifications, professional status, amount of real wealth and, to a 
lesser extent, the presence of financial liabilities. The factors that have a major 
impact are, therefore, economic and financial ones, and aspects related to the 
cultural and social position of family members. 
From the analyzed data, it emerges a close link between the propensity to get 
insured and the tendency to hold a lower amount of liquid assets on total financial 
wealth. Evidence shows that this relationship is expressed consistently given an 
equal amount of wealth, both financial and real, held by the households. This 
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work supports the hypothesis of a longer-term direction in the management of 
one’s assets by those households that have seized the benefits of insurance 
coverage. Further analyses, carried out in the appendix of this study, show 
another interesting phenomenon: the percentage (on financial wealth) of held 
liquid assets decreases as the number of insurance policies taken by the family 
increases. The high value taken by the linear correlation coefficient (more than 
99% in the calculation with the corrected figures) summarizes the close 
relationship between the two attitudes.  
Although further studies would be needed (for example, on the influence of 
family income or a more in-depth analysis of the composition of financial assets), 
the verification of the connection between insurance penetration and the 
lengthening of the time-span with which one’s financial wealth is managed, 
opens, from an operative point of view, new useful scenarios for banks and 
insurance companies. There is the prospect of an area of common action, where 
the benefits appear to be reciprocal. A wider distribution of non motor insurance 
policies (characterized by a high technical profitability for insurers) would favor 
a broadening of the range of financial instruments that can be offered 
successfully, primarily by lenders, to insured savers. For this purpose, branch 
office activities could be enhanced with adequate means of customer relationship 
management. On this basis, the adoption by a bank of a strategy for the sale of 
non motor insurance through its branches would enable to seize, in addition to 
profit from the sale of the insurance policies, also the goal of higher efficiency in 
offering financial instruments to its customers. This analysis shows how such 
option could have a great impact on the families with high financial wealth.  
From a more general point of view, a higher spread of non motor insurance 
policies, thanks to the protection against unpredictable events from current family 
“bank-insurance” to professional companies appropriately equipped to manage 
such risks, would let Italian families to count on solid guarantees against negative 
events, thus raising the level of safety among the population. 
Finally, in the light of the dimension of financial wealth of Italian families, 
estimated of over 3,565 billion Euros
29
, a deviation of just 10% of such resources 
from liquidity to instruments with a higher time horizon, would result in a more 
efficient use of nearly 350 billion Euros. This would be advantageous for Italian 
households, thanks to the higher return obtainable by longer-term investments, 
particularly those managed by professionals (asset management).  
                                                          
29
 Banca d’Italia, La ricchezza delle famiglie italiane 2009, supplemento al 
Bollettino Statistico, 20 December 2010.  
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Therefore there are positive reasons of general interest in favour of the spread of 
insurance policies against the risks encountered by Italian families, both when 
performing occupational activities and when leading daily life.  
 
Appendix 1: relationship between liquidity and 
number of insurance policies  
Established the relationship between the presence of non motor insurance policies 
and weight of liquidity on financial wealth, we want to verify if the latter 
decreases as the number of insurance policies decreases. 
In order to verify such hypothesis, insured families have been classified 
according to the number of non motor insurance policies subscribed to 
(Image15)
30
. Families holding more than 6 policies have been grouped into one 
class.  
Image 1 
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Table 9 also shows total deposits and total wealth per class. The last column 
shows the weight of liquidity on financial wealth calculated for each group.  
                                                          
30
 In this occasion too we have excluded from the analysis those families that, 
even if they subscribed to at least one non motor insurance policy, have a 
financial wealth equal to zero. 
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Table 2 
Number of 
contracts 
Number of 
families 
Deposits 
Financial 
Wealth 
% Deposits 
1 888 13,431,234 27,212,871 49.4% 
2 492 8,926,367 20,522,450 43.5% 
3 266 5,530,159 14,126,460 39.1% 
4 157 3,567,587 11,095,840 32.2% 
5 59 1,656,632 5,716,665 29.0% 
>=6 48 1,812,919 5,543,916 32.7% 
Total 1,910 34,924,898 84,218,202 41.5% 
 
These data are shown in Image 16. 
Image 16  
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The general tendency shows a decreasing of the weight of liquidity on financial 
wealth as the number of non motor insurance policies increases. An exception is 
the class of the households that hold six or more policies, for which there is an 
incidence of deposits on financial wealth higher than for the two previous 
categories. Actually, to such results contributes in a determining way a single 
family, which shows an anomalous attitude compared to the class to which it 
belongs. Excluding such observation from the calculation, we obtain the graph in 
Image 17:  
Image 17  
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The relationship thus established appears particularly close (the linear correlation 
coefficient is close to 100%). The analysis shows that from the initial value of 
54% circa, it is obtained a decreasing of 5,13% in the weight of deposit on 
financial wealth for each subscribed policy.  
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